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SECRECY AND THE SUPREME COURT: ON THE NEED FOR
PIERCING THE RED VELOUR CURTAIN
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER* and D. S. SASTRI t
Everything degenerates, even the administration of justice, nothing
is safe that does not show it can bear discussion and publicity.
Lord Acton**
INTRODUCTION
T he secrecy that envelops the Supreme Court's work," Justice
Felix Frankfurter once said, "is not due to love of secrecy or want
of responsible regard for the claims of a democratic society to know
how it is governed."1 The reason for it, he went on to say, is that the
Court could not function effectively if amenable to the forces of
publicity to which the Executive and the Congress are subjected.
2
To the extent that this position has received consideration from
judges and commentators, it has met with virtually unanimous ap-
proval. While not intended as an exhaustively documented study, this
article examines the historical and contemporaneous basis for this view,
and suggests a thorough reexamination of and an end to the opacity
which enshrouds Supreme Court operations.
Our thesis may be simply stated: basic democratic theory re-
quires that there be knowledge not only of who governs but of how
policy decisions are made. Only if it can be demonstrated that cer-
tain other fundamental Values are jeopardized or transgressed should
secrecy continue to be the norm. We maintain that the secrecy which
pervades Congress, the executive branch and the courts is itself the
enemy.
By quirk of fate, by design or by a bold, raw grab for power by
*Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. A.B.,
Willamette University, 1938; LL.B., Stanford Law School, 1949; J.S.D., Yale Law
School, 1959.
t B.L., Andhra University, 1957; LL.M., George Washington University, 1971;
S.J.D. Candidate, George Washington University.
** LORD ACTON AND His CIRCLE 166 (A. Gasquet ed. 1906).
1. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313 (1955).
2. Id.
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Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court has enormous power.
Through the votes of a bare majority, it can invalidate the actions
of any segment of federal or state government, or place its imprimatur
upon governmental actions. Moreover, it is the ultimate court of
statutory interpretation and administrative review. The Court sits,
thus, as a continuing constitutional convention-interpreting the great
generalities of the fundamental law, validating constitutional change,
and permitting often nebulous statutory language to be applied to
the rapidly changing circumstances of American life. In addition it
sometimes acts as a "national conscience," a norm-setter for the people;
and it is also a court of law.3 In short, the Supreme Court is, as
Frankfurter put it, "a very special kind of court."' 4 It is this special
character which demands rigid reexamination of the premises on
which the Court operates, one of which is the secrecy of its in-
ternal operations. For all we know, the Justices engage in some sort
of latter-day intellectual haruspication, followed by the assignment
of someone to write an opinion to explain, justify or rationalize the
decision so reached. The process is upset, of course, when dissenting
or concurring opinions are filed, as they so often are. The oracle then
speaks with multiple tongues, to the amusement of some and per-
plexity of others-particularly those who take seriously the proposi-
tion that ours is a "government of laws and not of men."
That the opinion (s) cannot be fully persuasive, or at times even
partially so, is a matter of common knowledge among those who make
their living following Court proclamations. Many think that these
decisions have a large impact upon American behavioral patterns and
mental attitudes. Indeed there may be at least a modicum of truth
in that position, although there have been few definitive studies on
either the general proposition or the specific decisional areas that
occupy the attention of the Justices.
That the Supreme Court makes law is so truistic that it need
not be argued here. Of course it does, whether that lawmaking is
merely interstitial, as Holmes long ago maintained, or "wholesale," as
in the era of the Warren Court. As Justice Byron R. White stated in
his dissenting opinion in Miranda v. Arizona:5
3. See R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AmERICAN SYSTEM1 OF Gov-
ERNMENT (1955).
4. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
781, 785 (1957).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Whe court has not discovered or found the law in making today's
decision, nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what
it has done is to make new law and new public policy in much the
same way that it has in the course of interpreting other great
clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court historically has
done. Indeed, it is what is must do and will continue to do until
and unless there is some fundamental change in the constitutional
distribution of governmental powers.6
But knowledge that the Justices are law-creators (whether in consti-
tutional or statutory questions) merely gives the result. In the few
dozen annual decisions "on the merits," one or more opinions obtain.
That these opinions are not intellectually satisfactory has been re-
peatedly stated in recent years; indeed many, perhaps most of them,
are not. They fail to explain; they ramble; they slur over major prob-
lems; they restate the issues and set the restatement out as reasons;
they fail to come to grips with important questions. They are all too
often "desperately negotiated documents": 7 the end-products of a
process of bargaining among the Justices. This does not make them
different from opinions of any previous era of the Court. Since the
beginnings of the Republic the Justices have contented themselves
with drafting opinions that law students can-and often do-pull
apart with dispatch and ease. That provides stimulation and cachet
for the students, happiness for those who do not like the results, and
at times anguish for judges-provided, of course, that the case anal-
yses are published.
The annoyance is that the opinion often obscures as much as it
enlightens, particularly when there are multiple opinions. If the
office of the opinion is to make decisions palatable to those who peruse
them, the lamentable fact is that often they do not explain. But it is
plausible that they are not intended to explain in any systematic or
complete fashion. Whatever conclusion one draws on that score, it is
clear enough that the murky nature of many opinions has led a num-
ber of commentators to call for a better judicial effort. In essence, this
demand-at times plaintive; at others raucous-seeks opinions that are
"principled" or in accord with "neutral principles" or "enduring and
impersonal principles." Otherwise, so we are warned, decisions (such as
6. Id. at 531.
7. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1957). See also A. MASON, HARLAN FisxE STONE:
PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956); W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
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Baker v. Carrs) are more politics than law; more fiat than reasoned
decision.9
These complaints should be taken seriously. They are being
made by observers who are often considered to be the luminaries of
a select profession. In our judgment, however, the observers pro-
foundly misunderstand the situation and misconstrue the nature and
function of the Supreme Court. They are, in final analysis, determined
that the Justices act as would the ideal judge under the Blackstonian
theory of the judicial process. The judge is "sworn to determine, not
according to his own private judgment, but according to the known
laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law,
but to maintain and expound the old one."' 0'
Yet judges do not so operate. According to J. Braxton Craven,
Jr., all are "result oriented," whether they admit it or not." They are
interested in the consequences of their decisions, however difficult it
may be for them to assess those consequences. If that be so, and surely
the evidence of history tends strongly to buttress Judge Craven's
position, the problem becomes not one of asking for the impossible-
"principled decisions" or "neutral principles"-but of determining
and revealing the values (the preferences, the predilections, the phi-
losophies) of judges. That done, judges must be held accountable;
not as described in the Frankfurter dichotomy-with the full glare of
publicity to which the Executive and Congress are allegedly subject-
but to the bar of thoughtful public opinion and history.
Ideally, the judicial opinion should provide a basis for under-
standing both why and how a decision was reached, as well as a means
for predicting the outcome of future controversies. The ideal is seldom
realized. One of the most intense and often baffling controversies in
American jurisprudence is centered on the requirement of adequate
judicial reasoning. Three sources of decision-values, rules and facts
-combine in the act of deciding. How judges reach their decisions
and formulate their reasoning into opinions is a psychological phe-
nomenon. It is this process-the "cause of decision" and of the de-
termination as to how to explain it in an opinion-which lies at the
root of judicial criticism. But since we "cannot explore the minds of
8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. Rnv. 252, 327.
10. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
11. Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N.C.L. R-v. 977 (1972).
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Justices, and what they do not put on paper we do not know,' 2 we
are kept in the dark about how policy decisions of the judiciary are
made. Moreover, it is obvious that in litigation two or more major
premises which embody conflicting interests can always be formulated.
Thus the process of decision making is a deliberate act choosing one
major premise and adopting it as the departure point for writing the
opinion.' 3 Judges seldom reveal publicly why a major premise was
chosen while other available premises were discarded. The unavoid-
able conclusion is that there is more to adjudication than what the
judges choose to say, either in their opinions or in their extrajudicial
utterances. Holmes said it well when he observed that "[t]he very con-
siderations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of
life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient in the com-
munity concerned.'1 4 Elsewhere he declared that in doubtful cases
which present "a conflict between two social desires" and for which
precedent offers no solution, "judges are called on to exercise the
sovereign prerogative of choice."' 5
An explicit recognition of the existence of a choice between two
premises is evident in the dissenting opinion in Mapp v. Ohio,'6
wherein Justice Harlan complains that the majority fails to explain the
choice of its premise. Mapp is typical: where there are dissenting opin-
ions and, therefore, conflicts as to the applicable major premise, the
majority rarely mentions and never explains alternative premises
which may be available.
Some scholars, frustrated by the lack of information on the
process of decision making, have produced explanatory theories such
as game theory and scalogram analysis. These have been appropriately
described by Professor Alan Westin as "scholarly astrology."' 7 While
12. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup.
CT. Rnv. 1, 32.
13. Miller, On the Choice of Major Premises in Supreme Court Opinions, 14 J.
PUB. L. 251 (1965). Justice Douglas made the same point in his dissenting opinion in
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 93 S. Ct. 827, 845 (1973): "The starting
point of a decision usually indicates the result."
14. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881). See also Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Lochner, Holmes stated
that "[t]he decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any
articulate major premise." Id. at 76.
15. 0. W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 239 (1920).
16. 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. A. WESTIN, THE SUPREME COURT: VIEWS FROM INSIDE 7 (1961).
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these theories merely substitute one alchemy for another, the very
fact that students of the Court exhibit a desire to gain a better under-
standing of the Court is ample proof that the opinions are inade-
quate to explain the decision making.
That decisions are often hammered out on the anvil of com-
promise is a second reason for the failure of the judicial opinion to
disclose the decision-making process. Such opinions are likely either
watered-down substitutes for the original drafts or documents filled
with the ambiguities of language incidental to such compromise.
Justice Robert H. Jackson suggested this when he observed that dis-
senting opinions "have a way of better pleasing those who read as
well as those who write them. . . .Opinions which must meet the
ideas of many minds may in comparison seem dull and undis-
tinguished."18
A third reason for the failure of an opinion to depict the process
may be found in the probability that judges work back from con-
clusions to principles rather than "forward" from principles to con-
clusions. Jerome Frank once said that this conception of the judicial
process is so heretical that it seldom finds expression." The "so-called
opinions," he explained, will not reveal anything remotely resembling
a statement of the actual judging process because decision takes place
by an intuitive flash rather than conscious application of formal logic
of ratiocination. This intuitive approach to decision making, by na-
ture and definition, precludes full explanation of the decision-maker's
experience, for it is not made up of "little bricks of sight, sound, taste,
and touch. '20 Somewhat akin to a Bergsonian element of intuition,
the judges' work consists of ordering facts, choosing premises, and
restating principles, plus grasping societal trends, in order to make
policies and state social norms. Such psychological insights into the
judicial process, if that they are, have been occasionally furnished by a
few judges. These rare insights emphasize the failure of judges to
make coherent explanations of the decisional process among them-
selves. Given this fact, opinions cannot reveal the process of decision
but can only offer reasons purportedly explaining the decisions.
Frankfurter confessed that
18. Address by Justice Jackson, Brandeis Memorial Dinner, June 23, 1943, in 9
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 665 (1943).
19. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
170 (1949).
20. Id.
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[tlhe power of searching analysis of what it is that they are doing
seems rarely to be possessed by judges, either because they are lack-
ing in the art of critical exposition, or because they are inhibited
from practicing it. The fact is that pitifully little of signifiance has
been contributed by judges regarding the nature of their endeavor.
21
The secrecy which surrounds the decision-making process compounds
the difficulty in understanding how policy decisions are made. The
public is deprived of the opportunity to gain insight which the judges
themselves seem unable to provide.
Having made bland assertions that secrecy is absolutely essential
for the performance of their tasks, the Justices have not proferred a
cogent explanation of the reason for the essentiality. Justice Tom
Clark maintained that without absolute secrecy, decisions would be-
come prematurely known and "the whole process of decision de-
stroyed." 22 But this does not explain why maintenance of secrecy
must be continued after the decision is taken or why judges suffer from
"judicial lockjaw. ' 23 Justice W. J. Brennan states that the conferences
are carried out in "absolute secrecy" for "obvious reasons" 24 and
avoids any further elucidation of the matter. These assertions suggest
that there is in the secrecy of the Supreme Court something of a
semi-holy arcanum, something untouchable on which the very effi-
ciency of the Court's functioning depends. It is the validity of that
notion that is challenged in this article.
All of this tends to be ancient learning, warranting no present
restatement were it not for the fact that there still has been no suffi-
cient jurisprudential effort in the United States-other than, perhaps,
the policy-science or configurative jurisprudence of Lasswell and
McDougal-since the legal realists first ripped the facade from the
Blackstonian conception of the judicial process several decades ago.
The pretense is still, as Dean Edward Levi noted a quarter-century
ago,25 that judges apply known law to accepted factual descriptions in
21. Frankfurter, Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial Process of
Supreme Court Litigation, 98 Am. PHILOSOPHICAL SOC. PROCEEDINGS 233 (1954).
22. Address by Justice Tom Clark, American Bar Association Annual Dinner in
Honor of the Judiciary of the United States, Aug. 27, 1956, in 19 F.R.D. 303, 305
(1956).
23. Frankfurter, Personal Ambitions of Judges: Should a Judge "Think Beyond the
Judicial"? 34 A.B.A.J. 656, 658 (1948).
24. Brennan, Working at Justice, in AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT
300 (A. Westin ed. 1963).
25. E. LEVi, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949).
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reaching their results-in short, Blackstone anew. This remains the
prevailing ideology of lawyers, as Judith Shklar pointed out,20 as well
as the reigning conception among those who edit casebooks for law
school use. American law and legal process still await a theorist who
will build upon the shambles left by the legal realists and construct
a viable jurisprudence for the age of science and technology.
It would be of some aid in that effort if scholars were able to
determine exactly how judges operate after the ritual of trial or ap-
pellate argument (or written presentation) has been performed. To
the extent that the Supreme Court is a law-maker, disclosure would
aid in the indispensable initial task of understanding the process.
Judicial secrecy should be viewed as part of our larger govern-
mental system. Speaking contextually, the penchant of American gov-
ernment, despite protestations to the contrary, is toward more and
more secrecy. For example, about one-third of all congressional com-
mittee sessions are secret. Despite the Freedom of Information Act,2T
the desire for secrecy within the bureaucracy is only too evident.
Modem government is not open in any reasonably adequate sense of
that term. Open it may be when compared with totalitarian nations,
but when measured against the ideal, it falls well short. There may
be reasons for this, not all of which are invalid. Carl J. Friedrich, for
instance, asserts that some secrecy is "functional" in a democratic
polity.28
I. THE WAY SECRECY CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT
Those who maintain that secrecy is essential to the judicial process
have lost sight of its historical origins in the deliberations of the Su-
preme Court. A recapitulation of that history is made here to show
that secrecy has survived as a vestige, having more symbolic than func-
tional significance. During colonial days, ultimate appeal from the
colonial courts was to the Privy Council in England.20 The Council
in many respects paralleled the appellate jurisdiction now vested in
the Supreme Court of the United States. Decisions of the Privy Coun-
26. J. SHXLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
28. C. FRIEDRICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS 179 (1972).
29. R. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 63 (1940). See also G. RADCLIFFE &
G. CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 215 (2d ed. 1946).
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cil were those of the majority of judges expressed as unanimous advice
to the Crown. No dissents were permitted, for the King had to speak
with a single voice.
The House of Lords, on the other hand, served as the supreme
appellate court for cases arising in England. This tribunal, in con-
trast to the unanimous opinions of the Privy Council, published the
opinions of their Lordships seriatim. However, because the House of
Lords was a wing of the legislature discharging judicial functions, the
early prohibition of the publication of the reports of Parliament ap-
plied equally to the judicial decisions of the Lords. Their opinions,
therefore, were not readily accessible to the public in England or the
colonies.
These two courts were the final courts of appeal, but most cases
were actually concluded in the King's Bench, Court of Common
Pleas, or the Exchequer chamber. In these courts, the opinions of the
Justices were delivered seriatim, a practice common to all common-law
courts. And, save in an exceptional case where judgment was re-
served for further consideration, the opinion of the Justices was de-
livered at the conclusion of argument. A small notation "C.A.V."30
appeared in the reports to denote cases in which the delivery of opin-
ion was postponed.
When Lord Mansfield became Lord Chief Justice of the King's
Bench in 1756, he introduced a new practice: decisions were arrived
at during brief conferences of judges and the unanimous opinions of
the court were delivered immediately thereafter. His biographers3'
reveal that this practice was developed to avoid the postponement of
a decision and the repeated rehearing of a case-a notorious evil
requiring drastic remedy. After Lord Mansfield retired in 1793, Lord
Kenyon-who never agreed with him32 became Lord Chief Justice
and promptly abolished the practice. Except for this brief interlude
"in common law history the centuries of the Year Books rest on a
practice of conference, consultation, and decision going on in open
court before the ears and eyes of counsel, the bar at large, and the
apprentices .... ,,33
30. "Curia advisari vult. Literally, 'The court wishes to consider the matter.' " 25
C.J.S. Curia at 41 (1966). Earlier American reports contain the notation Cur. ad.
Vult., which is another form of passing the order for postponement of decision.
31. 2 J. CADIPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 399-401
(1849).
32. Id.
33. K. LLEWELLYN, THE CommON LAW TRADITION 324 n.308 (1960).
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The first Justices of the Supreme Court seemed to have drawn
upon the customs of the English courts, particularly the King's Bench,
since early decisions were announced seriatim by all the Court's mem-
bers.34 There is some evidence that in Brown v. Barry,35 Chief Justice
Ellsworth delivered "the opinion of the Court" and no other opin-
ions were filed. In Bas v. Tingy,36 Mr. Justice Chase observed that he
did not prepare an opinion because the judges had unanimously
agreed; thus suggesting a departure from the previous practice. But
it was Chief Justice Marshall who introduced the practice of Justices
conferring at a meeting and arriving at a decision to be subsequently
announced in open court.37
Thomas Jefferson objected to Chief Justice Marshall's habit of
"caucusing opinions" and "his practice of making up opinions in
secret and delivering them as the orders of the court," irrespective
of whether there was a majority of one or more.38 Jefferson's cri-
ticism of this practice stemmed from his belief that the 'cooking up of
a decision and delivering it by one of their members as the opinion of
the court without the possibility of our knowing how many, who, or
for what reasons each member concurred . . . completely defeat[ed]
the possibility of impeachment by smothering evidence."8 9
The Jeffersonian criticism of Marshall's approach indicates that
the secrecy of the conference room was a strategy adopted by the
Chief Justice to thwart the threat of impeachment and to strengthen
the Court by rendering it immune from the attacks of Jefferson and
Madison in the wake of the impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase
in 1804. A letter from Justice Johnson to Jefferson stated that he was
a little surprised to find our Chief Justice in the Supreme Court
delivering all the opinions ... . But I remonstrated in vain; the
34. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Dis-
integration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 192 (1959). See also Rule, 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 411
(1792) (in which the Court considers the procedures of King's Bench and Chancery
in England-which afford outlines for the practice-and indicates that the Court will
alter its practice from time to time when modification is necessitated by the cir-
cumstances).
35. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797).
36. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 35,41 (1800).
37, 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919). Contra, 1 C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 655 (rev. ed. 1935)
(Warren seems to think that the change in Court practice originated prior to Marshall's
accession to the bench).
38. Extracts from letters of Thomas Jefferson in 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 653-54 (rev. ed. 1935).
39. Id. at 654.
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Answer was he is willing to take the trouble and it is a Mark of
Respect to him. I soon however found out the real Cause. Gush-
ing was incompetent. Chase could not be got to think or write-
Paterson was a slow man and willingly declined the Trouble, and
the other two (Marshall and Bushrod Washington) are commonly
estimated as one judge.
40
The practice established by Marshall was described by his bi-
ographer, Albert Beveridge, as "one of those acts of audacity that later
marked the assumption of power which rendered his career heroic.
'41
When Marshall disqualified himself, the Justices delivered opinions
seriatim; no conference appears to have taken place in those cases. The
conclusion is inescapable that the conference of Justices in strict secrecy
originated with Chief Justice Marshall for reasons now lost in an-
tiquity and which are no longer germane to the United States. Al-
though Marshall believed that unanimity lent prestige to the Court
and that the indecency of public disagreement resulted in loss of repu-
tation, in his own term of office as Chief Justice he dissented in at
least nine cases. 42 Since then, the "dissenting Justice" has become only
too common. During the past forty years, divisions of opinion among
the Justices have increased to the point where unanimity in cases
decided on the merits is unusual. As a consequence, the current situa-
tion parallels the English practice of filing seriatim opinions, yet the
secrecy of the conference room persists. At the same time, it must be
admitted that the conference of judges has failed to secure the ends
envisioned by Chief Justice Marshall.
Those who believe that the Court cannot arrive at a decision
openly should ponder the words of Karl Llewellyn:
It is well to remember that neither secrecy of the court's delibera-
tion or [sic] later secrecy about what went on during that delibera-
tion rests in the nature of things or in any ordinance of God. The
roots of each are either practical or accidental, and it is only either
ignorance or tradition which makes us feel that we have here some-
thing untouchable, a semiholy arcanum. We tend to forget that in
common law history the centuries of the Year Books rest on a prac-
40. Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter, 43 MICH. L. REv.
497, 516 (1944); Comment, Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Constitution, 57
HARV. L. REv. 328, 333 (1944).
41. 3 A. BEVERmGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919).
42. Machen, Dissent and Stare Decisis in the Supreme Court, 45 MD. S.B. Ass'N
79, 91 (1940).
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tice of conference, consultation, and decision going on in open court
before ears and eyes of counsel, the bar at large, and the apprentices;
and most of us do not know that the Supreme Court of our first
neighbor to the South still works out its conferences in this same
solid common law fashion. I personally suspect that our own secrecy
practice began when decision began to be postponed beyond the
close of argument, with an eye to avoiding misapprehension and dis-
appointment, and then to avoiding financial speculation. And I sus-
pect the carryover into later secrecy about past deliberations to repre-
sent partly a closing of ranks to protect the court from criticism or
attack, and in later years a similar cloiing to allow free discussion
with no possible repercussions in a re-election campaign. Thus
the storied sanctity of the conference room represents to me as prag-
matic and nonmystic a phase of appellate judicial work as the
handling of the docket. Our modem fetish of secrecy reminds me of
the shock German lawyers displayed at the notion of such dangerous
things as published dissenting opinions.
43
II. COURTS IN OTHER NATIONS
A comparative study of the conventions observed by the highest
courts in other nations highlights different techniques of judicial
decision making. In the most primitive type, no reasons are given by
the judge and no appeal is provided against his decision. In such in-
stances the litigants or members of the public have no way of knowing
how or why the decision was reached. History is replete with exam-
ples of such grants of arbitrary judicial power. Our conscience is
shocked by them; they are denounced as "muslim curb stone disposi-
tion[s]"; 44 and we assure ourselves that such barbarian and auto-
cratic judicial power has no place in our society.
Contemporary practice of the highest courts in several countries
conforms to three different modes of arriving at decisions. Under the
first mode, the highest court decides in strict secrecy and expresses
the final decision unanimously-irrespective of any conflict of opinion
among the various members of the court. Dissent is simply suppressed.
43. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 324 n.308 (1960).
44. G. HAZARD, RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 8-9 (1963). See also Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Turkish judges
(qadi), observed Francesco Guicciardini, judged with closed eyes. After studying their
decisions, this Florentine historian came to the conclusion that their probability of error
was no greater than that of Tuscan judges of his day. P. CALAMANDREI, PROCEDURE AND
DEMOCRACY 21 (1956).
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This method is the norm of continental courts. 45 The second pattern
also involves secret determinations, but judges who are unable to
agree with the majority are allowed to state their reasons in dissent-
ing opinions. The third method is distinguished from the first two
in that the decision is arrived at in open court and the judges are
allowed to state their views publicly. We believe that a study of these
three methods would destroy the notion that secrecy is absolutely es-
sential to decision-making, and would indicate that no peculiarly
cherished values are preserved by maintaining such secrecy.
A. Swiss Federal Court and Mexican Supreme Court
The Swiss Federal Court 8 and the Mexican Supreme Court are
examples of tribunals which arrive at their decision at a public con-
ference. The Swiss Federal Court, the highest court in Switzerland,
consists of twenty-six judges organized into divisions of seven or five
depending upon the nature of the case. Seven judges comprise the
public law division. Parties or counsel do not appear before the court
to argue their cases; these are submitted by mail. The presiding judge
appoints one of the judges to serve as a reporter to prepare a sum-
mary of the case, the arguments of the parties, the issues involved in
the case, and his conclusions thereon. These are circulated to the other
judges who communicate their views to the presiding judge and com-
ment upon the report informally. On the designated date for decision,
the judges assemble in the courtroom, where newspapermen, lawyers,
and the public are present. The judge-reporter reads his written report
to the court. If any judge has communicated an opposing view to the
presiding judge, he then states his views on the matter publicly, after
which a discussion among the judges takes place. After all of the judges
have expressed themselves, the reporter makes a reply to the opposing
judge's remarks and the discussion then takes the form of questions
and answers. At the end of the discussion, the reporting judge pro-
poses a vote to be taken on his motion and the presiding judge puts
the proposition to vote by show of hands. The Registrar then pre-
45. See, e.g., J. CALAMANDREi, supra note 44 at 45-46; Kommers, The Federal
Constitutional Court in the West German Political System, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL
RESEARCH 81 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus eds. 1969).
46. Morrison, The Swiss Federal Court: Judicial Decision Making and Recruit-
ment, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 139 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus eds.
(1969); W. RICE, A TALE OF Two COURTS (1967).
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pares a written report of the conference to communicate to the par-
ties-dissenting votes are not recorded. The entire decision-making
process takes place in public and dissent is not suppressed.
The Mexican Supreme Court47 also conducts its conferences in
public. In a courtroom filled with spectators, the reporting judge is
called upon by the presiding judge to read the draft of the decision he
has prepared and to lead the discussion. The various judges express
their views openly and the reporting judge meets criticism by giving
a final reply. Each judge then announces his vote. If the majority
votes in favor, the draft opinion prepared by the reporting judge is
adopted by the court. Otherwise, another reporter is appointed, a
new draft prepared, and the process is repeated.
B. Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany and Its Cousins
The other extreme example is the Federal Constitutional Court
of West Germany.48 This court has power over cases involving consti-
tutional disputes between the federation and the states, as well as
between citizens and governments. It follows the well-known con-
tinental tradition of pronouncing "institutional" decisions. The judges
labor in anonymity and their deliberations are required by law to be
absolutely secret. Dissents are not published nor are the votes of the
various judges disclosed. In the first stage of the decisional process, the
reporter-judge prepares a full statement of the facts and arguments
and a recommended decision. This report is circulated among the
other judges in the panel. At a conference, which takes place in abso-
lute secrecy, the judges cast their votes; this is the second stage of the
decisional process. In the third stage, the reporter-judge, irrespective
of whether he is in the majority or minority, prepares the opinion to
reflect the consensus of the judges. The fourth and final stage is a
further conference held to discuss the opinion and edit it to obtain
maximum consensus. Only then is the decision announced.
The Supreme Court of Japan49 succeeded the Daishin-in, which
followed the continental practice of delivering per curiam opinions
without expressing dissent. During American occupation following
47. P. CALAMANDREI, supra note 44; R. DE PINA, TEMAS DE DERECHO PROCESAL
101-08 (2d ed. Mexico 1951).
48. Kommers, supra note 45, at 73-83.
49. Danelski, The Supreme Court of Japan: An Exploratory Study, in CoMfPARA-
-nvE JuDiciAL BEHAVIOR 121, 132-37 (G. Schubert & D. Danelski eds. 1969).
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World War II, a new court with three divisions was organized. When
a party presents his case, a research official of the court prepares a
meticulously detailed case report which is examined by a judge who
is assigned to the case by the Chief Justice. The reporting judge sets
a date for the case to be considered at a secret conference of the divi-
sion. If it is decided that the case will be heard, the parties are asked
to file briefs and argue the case. During argument, the judges "sit like
Buddha until the lawyer is finished," without putting any questions;
then the case is scheduled for a second conference. The designated
judge usually prepares the opinion, which is discussed and voted upon.
The final decision of the court is expressed in an anonymous opinion.
Although traditionally the Japanese despise dissent, occasionally a
dissenting opinion is delivered by the justices of the modern Supreme
Court.5o
In the English and Commonwealth courts of appeals, cases are
heard without any advance preparation by the judges: 51 there are
no briefs to read, and the judges learn of the case from the oral argu-
ments of counsel. The questioning of counsel during oral argument
tends to be extensive; and the trend of the judges' thought is revealed
in the course of a Socratic dialogue. Often questions are directed to
fellow justices. The judges become involved in reality "immediately,
consciously and deliberately," in reaching a decision while the argu-
ment is in progress. The decision is usually delivered upon the close
of the argument. Each judge states his own opinion extemporaneously.
If an alternative ground of decision or dissent is to be expressed, it is
done without any reservation. The "whispered conversation" lasting
a minute or two on bench while arguments are in progress, or while
walking in the corridor before entering or leaving the courtroom, is
the only conference that takes place in most cases. On occasion, a
decision may require more deliberation or reflection. In such cases,
the decision is reserved and delivered later. However, there is no
conscious and deliberate effort to obtain a consensus or bargain for a
result.
52
The House of Lords-the highest court in England-hears cases
in a very informal atmosphere. Judges wear contemporary business
50. Kawashima, Individualism in Decision-Making in the Supreme Court of Japan,
in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 103, 104-09 (G. Schubert & D. Danelski eds. 1969).
51. D. KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 93
(1963).
52. Id. at 98-99.
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suits, not wigs or robes. They sit not on a dais, but on ordinary chairs
behind plain tables arranged in a row. The barristers, however, wear
robes and wigs while appearing before the Lords. Oral argument fol-
lows the same pattern as in the Court of Appeals, but with the argu-
ments sometimes lasting for twenty days. Unlike the Court of Appeals,
an immediate decision is rarely reached after the conclusion of the
oral argument. Each judge writes his opinion and circulates it to the
other judges, who may or may not meet to reconcile their views. It
is unusual to reach a consensus to be expressed in a per curiam opin-
ion.53 Each judge expresses his own views. When all the judges are
prepared, a special sitting of the House of Lords is convened. The Lord
Chancellor sits on a woolsack dressed in full regalia, while the other
judges wear their regular business suits. After prayers led by a bishop,
each judge proceeds to read his opinion. Finally, the Lord Chancellor
puts the question to which the judges answer "content" or "not con-
tent," and the case is disposed of.
The Privy Council, on the other hand, follows a slightly different
procedure, even though with a few exceptions, the judges who sit in
the House of Lords also sit as the Privy Council. Because the decision
of the Privy Council is in the nature of advice tendered to the Crown,
the judges are required to express their decision unanimously. There-
fore, after a designated judge prepares the draft of the judgment, it is
circulated to the other judges who-by discussion, conferences, and re-
drafting-strive for a consensus. 5 4 If a minority continues to differ,
they remain silent, and only the opinion of the majority is made
public. Only the last paragraph of the opinion is read aloud in the
informal court without the splendor attendant to the House of Lords.
The foregoing summary tends to show that robes or business suits,
unanimity or dissent, deliberation or immediate decision, lengthy
or brief argument, secrecy or openness, neither promote nor destroy
decision making: they are not essential to that process. The practices of
courts in many lands are diverse. Whether the secrecy of the Supreme
Court's conference need be maintained must be decided by the values
furthered or hindered by that maintenance, not by flat assertion.
53. Id. at 127.
54. Address of Rt. Hon. Lord Morton, P.C., M.C., Canadian Bar Association
Annual Meeting, Aug. 31, 1949, in 32 PROCEEDINGS CAN. BAR Ass'N 107, 115 (1949).
Rumor has it that the Privy Council split 3-2 in the Wagon Mound Case, [1961] A.C.
338. See HALDANE SOCIETY, THE FORESIGHT SAGA 3 (1962).
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III. THE VALUES PURPORTEDLY FURTHERED By SECRECY
The Supreme Court of the United States is, of course, not merely
a court of law. America, a nation of constitution worshipers, regards
the fundamental law as a sacred covenant; and the Supreme Court, as
its guardian and keeper, is touched with its divinity. As Lerner ex-
plained, the Justices of the Supreme Court cannot help playing the
role of a sacerdotal group as tenders of the scared flame. 55 Chief
Justice Taft, commenting on the values of judicial folkways, ob-
served that
[J]udges should be clothed in robes, not only that those who wit-
ness the administration of justice should be properly advised that
the function performed is one different from, and higher than that
which a man discharges as a citizen in the ordinary walks of life;
but also, in order to impress the judge himself with constant con-
sciousness that he is a high-priest in the temple of justice .... 56
That, at best, is dubious. Even a casual observer of the practice of the
House of Lords and Privy Council, as has been seen, cannot fail to ob-
serve that their Lordships hold court in business suits in a country
where wigs, bands and silk gowns are worn by judges and lawyers at
every level of the judicial system, and that this does not detract from
the importance of their position as the ultimate arbiters in England
and some Commonwealth countries.
A parallel can be drawn between Chief Justice Taft's insistence
on robe-wearing as essential to the discharge of the judicial function,
and the observance of strict and absolute secrecy in decision making
by the Supreme Court. Somewhere in the depths of the minds of the
55. 1 M. LERNER, AMERICA As A CIVILIZATION 442-43 (1957). Bacon long ago
declared that
Judges ought to remember, that their office is Jus dicere, and not Jus dare;
to interpret law and not to make law, or give law. Else will it be like the
authority, claimed by the Church of Rome, which under the pretext of
exposition of Scripture, doth not stick to add or alter; and to pronounce
that which they do not find; and by show of antiquity to introduce novelty.
Bacon, Of judicature, in ESSAYS, ADVANCEIENT OF LEARNING, NEW ATLANTIS AND
OTHER PIECES 155 (R. F. JONES ed. 1937). The idea that authoritative interpreters of
written documents exert influence like that of a priesthood's is an ancient one.
56. A. MASON, WILLIAMi HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 58 (1965). See also
Frank, Cult of tle Robe, SATURDAY REV., Oct. 13, 1945, at 12: "The Robe as a symbol
is out of date, an anachronistic remnant of ceremonial government .... The cult of
the robe should be discarded."
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Judges must reside the belief that the "inspired revelation"' 7 about
"the will of the law" emerges exclusively in the confines of the secret
conference room.
This position is untenable. If the will of the law is not the product
of "inspired revelation," but rather flows from negotiation, bargain-
ing and compromise, it is obvious that the Justices fear that the
Court's stature as an infallible finder of truth would be undermined
by this disclosure. As Max Lerner put it, the Constitution and the
Court are symbols of ancient sureness and forthcoming stability58
Those who plead for a continuation of these myths ignore the fact
that the founding fathers were-and the Supreme Court Justices are-
human (notwithstanding the Mormon assertion to the contrary) .5
The Constitution is not an inspired document and its interpreters are
but mortals. This "sureness and stability" argument is as shallow as
the argument of several continental jurists that the International
Court of Justice should not permit the expression of dissent because
countries at the losing end may not feel bound to obey the decisions
of a divided court.60 Experience in the past has shown that in an area
so nebulous as international law, where widely divergent opinions
exist as to fundamental legal questions, expression of dissent has not
undermined the authority of the court and that fears of loss of prestige
have proved to be ill-founded. 6' One jurist even opined that the
divergent views stirring and seething in that court must be visible to
all the world. The world ought to know the grounds and the con-
test on which the decision was taken. It should also know the limits
57. B. CARDozo, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 11
(1931).
58. See Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290 (1937).
The image of the Supreme Court in the minds of the American public is portrayed
in an account by the actress Sada Thompson. She recalled a humorous incident which
occurred when her daughter was a child.
I took her to the Supreme Court. I told her about the Chief Justice at the
center place and the men around him and how sacred the place was to our
American Institutions. I looked down at her and-she was kneeling ....
Washington Post, Dec. 24, 1972, § C, at 2, col. 2.
59. "We stand for the Constitution of the United States as having been divinely
inspired." Deseret News (Salt Lake City), July 1, 1968, at 14, quoted in C. MILLER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 182 n.41 (1967). See also Witcovcr,
We Birchers Are Trained to Look for Patterns, NEw REPUBLIC, May 8, 1965, at 8,
quoting Reed Benson: "We believe that the Lord helped raise up the Founding
Fathers to establish the Constitution ......
60. J. VERZIJL, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WORLD COURT 405 (1965).
61. Id. at 416.
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of the viability of international adjudication: whether it will ultimately
prove to be more than a "great illusion."
'6 2
The Supreme Court was not handicapped in the past by revela-
tion of the decision-making process. We already have a portrayal of how
particular justices and their ideological confreres approach their task,
what they consider relevant to decision and how they strike the four
or five major balances of competing values which every sensitive justice
consciously makes. Judges may (and do) change their votes after decid-
ing, because an opinion "won't write" or because of the persuasiveness
of a dissenting opinion. 63 Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy changed
their minds publicly in the flag-salute cases.64 During Justice Joseph
Story's tenure, members of the Court discussed rather freely the out-
come of pending cases. 5 Chief Justice Chase, "in strict secrecy,"
gave advance notice to Treasury Secretary Boutwell of the Court's
decision in the Legal Tender Cases;66 President Buchanan was given
foreknowledge by Justice Catron of the Court's decision in the Dred
Scott Case;67 and there is a vivid account of a leak of the Supreme
Court's position in the Missouri Test Oaths Cases.65
Apart from the assertion that secrecy is essential for traditional
reasons, a further ground on which it is justified is the independence
of the Court. Secrecy of deliberations, it is argued, tends to preserve
the independence of the Justices because they speak out frankly to
their brethren, without the outside influence of groups or individuals.
This argument is shallow when subjected to criticial analysis, for the
judges have no reason not to speak out frankly in open court and lay
bare their minds. As lifetime appointees, they have security of tenure.
If security is not their concern, then what is passing through their
minds about the vital issues that are brought before them is a matter
of which the public has a right to know. The ideas rejected by them
62. Prof. Verzijl refuted the arguments favoring secrecy. Id.
63. Freund, An Analysis of Judicial Reasoning, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A
Symposium 288 (S. Hook ed. 1964). See also R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERN.MENT 15 (1955).
64. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942).
65. Cushman, The History of the Supreme Court in Resumi, 7 MINN L. Rav. 305
(1923).
66. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). G. BOUTWELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY
YEARS 209 (1902).
67. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 495-502
(1936).
68. Fish, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: judicial Indiscretion and Reconstruc-
tion Politics, 8 Wms. & MARY L. REv. 225 (1967).
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are as important for public enlightenment as the ideas advocated in
their opinions. The other part of the justification for secrecy, founded
on escape from outside influences, also does not bear scrutiny. By de-
liberating cases in open court, the Justices would inform the public
not only that such influence is absent but also that it is unwelcome.
When deliberation is cloaked in secrecy, the public has no way of
knowing who exerts influence over decisions. The persistent inquiries
about who decides applications for certiorari 69-whether a committee
of Justices or the law clerks-notwithstanding the Justices' assertions
that they alone decide them, is an example of the lingering public
doubts concerning the decision-making process. In the Marshall era,
rumors were rife that decisions pronounced as those of the Court were
in fact Marshall's own decisions or products of a minority which sup-
pressed majority viewpoints.70 It was also believed that Justices de-
cided cases at the behest of Marshall, even when he disqualified him-
self on account of personal interest.7 1 Such unpleasant and unpala-
table rumors could have been eliminated by open deliberation.
Several reasons which justify secrecy as an essential element of
the judicial process have thus emerged: (1) tradition; (2) prevention
of "leaks"; and (3) necessity as an element of decision making which
promotes frank discussion and insulates from external pressure. All
are ill-founded and have either ceased to exist or conflict with demo-
cratic theory. Secrecy of the decisional process remains only as a
myth-justified vestige in the evolution of the institution. It came into
69. Clark, How Cases Get Into the Supreme Court, in AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY oF
THE SUPREME COURT 291, 297 (A. Westin ed. 1963): "[The] idea of the law clerks'
influence gave rise to a lawyer's waggish statement that the Senate no longer need bother
about confirmation of Justices but ought to confirm the appointment of law clerks."
70. See J. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 309-10 (1877). In 1822, Justice Johnson wrote that
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court even when contrary to his opinion and
vote. Morgan, Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Constitution, 57 HARv. L. Rev.
328, 333 (1944).
71. See, e.g., G. MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 273 (1912):
Chief Justice John Marshall and his brother managed to get legal hold
of the much desired "Leeds Manor," by a decision of his own court, handed
down by an Associate Justice whose fraudulent case, involving such immense
interests, had been decided favorably by Marshall three years previously.
Story's decision revealed an amazingly comprehensive intimacy with all twists
and turnings of ancient Virginia laws, legislation and practices-a knowledge
which no other member of the Supreme Court but Marshall had. In fact, it
has never been disputed that Story, in his Supreme Court career, was a
complete satellite of Marshall, and registered into decisions the species of
law dictated by Marshall; Story himself practically acknowledged this.
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existence at a time when the Court was a weak, infant institution.
Its contribution to the evolution of a strong Supreme Court is
doubtful.
IV. CRACKS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: THE MURKY STREAM OF
COMMUNICATION TO THE DECISION MAKER
The process of informing the judicial mind of the data for deci-
sion has undergone a radical change since the inception of the Court.
The complicated nature of the cases that are brought before it and
the creative role of the Court in adjudication require departure from
the traditional adversary system. In making policy decisions and
weighing considerations of social advantage, the Court has to inform
itself beyond the narrow interests of the partisans involved in a
"case" or "controversy." Yet, the parties who bring the cases before
the Court have no obligation to provide those insights to the Justices.
Justices, therefore, supplement the information obtained from records,
briefs, and oral arguments with independent research 2 and personal
experience. A pertinent but unanswerable question concerns the ex-
tent to which independent research may proceed before transgressing
the "case" and "controversy" limitations. Justice Frankfurter once
remarked that he did not know that the Justices "could not read the
works of competent writers."73 But can the Court ignore writings
which are critical of judicial determinations? Can the Justices acquire
the "sociological wisdom" which the law requires by doing inde-
pendent research? Or do they convey the existence of such wisdom by
quoting scholars to justify their conclusions in an opinion?
Moreover, the parties who bring a "case" or "controversy" before
the Court, thus creating the opportunity to make policy decisions,
should be entitled to rebut independent findings of the Justices if the
adversary system's premise that adverse evidence must be subjected
to the scrutiny of partisans is to be treated at least as a token obliga-
tion of the decision maker. Does the moral force of a judgment
weaken if the Justices venture beyond the materials presented by the
72. Brennan, Working at Justice, in AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT
303 (A. Westin ed. 1963).
73. W. MURPHY & C. H. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS 318 (1961),
quoting Justice Frankfurter's comment in the oral argument of Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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parties, explore critical social problems and prescribe solutions, while
pretending merely to decide "cases" or "controversies?" 74 Finally, but
of equal importance, do the Justices have the expertise to embark
upon such expeditions? Assuming they do, what data should the
parties provide? What principles should be parties formulate for se-
lection of the correct evaluative criteria? How would the judges react
to the data furnished and how do they use it to make policy decisions?
While knowledgeable people realize that the adversary system
of providing information for the judicial mind is proving inade-
quate, design of an alternative system is hampered by a lack of exact
knowledge about the decisional process. If the veil of secrecy were to
be lifted, a more functional system could be devised. Cardozo la-
mented that "we have had courts and recorded judgments for cen-
turies, but for lack of an accepted philosophy of law, we have not yet
laid down for our judges the underlying and controlling principles that
are to shape the manner of their judging."7 5 The lack of an adequate
philosophy of law can in part be attributed to the failure to compre-
hend better the operation and limitations of the judicial decision-
making process.
There are, of course, other ways to inform the judicial mind.
The orthodox conception permits only adversarial input plus the
nebulous idea of judicial notice-although, as has been seen, some in-
dependent research is conducted. How much input into the process
comes from law clerks or other sources remains unclear. After serving
as a clerk to Justice Robert H. Jackson and practicing law for a few
years, William H. Rehnquist wrote: "I do not believe it can be de-
bated that the possibility for influence by the clerks exists" when a
Justice votes on a certiorari petition. He went on to maintain that
where unconscious slanting of the material by the law clerks occurs,
it is toward the "left" or "liberal" side of the spectrum.70 Rehnquist's
article, published in U.S. News & World Report, is atypical; most law
clerks apparently have drummed into them the need for keeping the
internal operations of the Court secret. A little leaks out now and
then, in informal talks with former clerks, but after a year's judicial
brain-washing about secrecy, most clerks are so circumspect as to make
Rehnquist's article notorious.
74. L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 707 (1949).
75. B. CARDozO, THE GROWTH OF LAW 144 (1924).
76. Rehnquist, Who Writes the Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Dec. 13, 1957, at 74-75.
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It is said, furthermore, that two Justices once directed that a
room in the Supreme Court building be set aside and the admiralty
books from the Library of Congress be assembled there, so that the
law clerks could extract from every volume anything that might pos-
sibly bear on the subject of the case in hand.7 7 Sometimes help must
come from outside, the law clerks proving inadequate. On one occa-
sion, the Solicitor General effected the assignment of the country's
best legal historian to the Court for a year to write the history of
treason.78 Another example of outside input is illustrated by the so-
called Patman Indictment,70 in which Representative Wright Patman
charged that authors of many of the materials considered by the Su-
preme Court had been partisan and that prominent scholars had been
hired by antitrust defendants to promote the views of big business in
law and economics review articles. Whether Patman was (or con-
tinues to be) correct cannot be determined; but the American people
are entitled to know.
Judicial notice is a particularly troublesome aspect of the in-
forming process. The rule of thumb is that notice may be taken of
matters of general knowledge-but what may general knowledge to one
judge may be, in Judge Jerome Frank's pungent terminology, mere
cocktail party gossip ° to another. Frankfurter asked during oral argu-
ment in Brown v. Board of Education1 whether judicial notice could
be taken of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma. But that is
hardly a valid conception, unless and until we are told the criteria by
which notice is taken and, further, unless the adversaries are given
the opportunity to introduce "expert" testimony to support their
clients' points of view. In Dennis v. United States,82 the case uphold-
ing "thought control" under the first amendment, Frankfurter strayed
far afield in seeking support for his conclusion that the Communist
Party of America, as exemplified by Dennis and his cohorts, was a
menace to the nation.
When judges admittedly use such diverse means of informing
77. J. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE 114 (1961).
78. Id. at 115.
79. 103 CONG. REC. 16159-69 (1957). See also Newland, The Supreme Court
and Legal Writing: Learned Journals as Vehicles of an Anti-antitrust Lobby?, 48 GEo.
L.J. 105 (1959).
80. Frank, The Lawyers Role in Modern Society: A Round Table, 4 J. PuB. L. 8,
16 (1955).
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. 341 U.S. 494, 521 (1951) (concurring opinion).
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themselves, it becomes obvious that the adversary system has broken
down in part. It further becomes obvious that the stream of communi-
cation to the Justices qua policy-makers should be cleansed, so that all
who wish to know can know in fact what is relevant to the decisional
process. Secrecy now makes the stream so murky that it is only by
informed guesses that a lawyer (or a commentator) can determine
what in fact was important to a given Justice. Perhaps one of the
reasons that "the average level of oral advocacy in the Court is ...
disappointingly low"'83 is the very failure of the Justices to make clear
just what it is they consider important in a given case. In any event,
the flow of communication is not known. It should be.
V. THE VALUES FURTHERED BY DISCLOSURE
In a polity that considers itself to be democratic, secrecy should
be the exception and openness and disclosure the rule. Only if it can
be demonstrated that there is a pressing public need for secrecy-as
in certain national security matters-should it be permitted. The
point is applicable wherever governing power is exercised. Members
of priesthoods traditionally wish to withhold their rituals and other
arcanae from the public at large, perhaps as a way of maximizing
their power. But that is scarcely a valid reason to support judicial
secrecy in a nation that prides itself on being both democratic and
enlightened.
Disclosure of the mysteries of Supreme Court decision making
would aid in the achievement of a fuller understanding of the Court;
and through that understanding, improve the process of judicial
policy-making. More subtly, but of great importance, it would be a
means of furthering the democratic ideal. Unless one believes with
Alexander Hamilton that the people are a "great beast," then they
83. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD
OF THE SUPRE '-ME COURT 42 (1972). The Report, issued by a study group chaired by
Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School, calls for the establishment of a
"national court of appeals" to screen certiorari petitions as a means of alleviating what
is alleged to be a crushing workload on the Justices. Absent, however, full information
about how the Justices in fact routinely work--something kept from the public by the
secrecy syndrome of the Court-no one can really make a dispassionate analysis of the
problem. Compare, in this connection, Freund, Why We Need the National Court of
Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973) with Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A
Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973). (The present authors agree with Mr. Gressman on
the need for such a court.)
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should be considered to have the internal fiber and moral stamina
to withstand knowing the internal operations of the governing process.
It may, for that matter, decrease the amount of cynicism already ex-
tant. As matters now stand, the federal judiciary stands last among
the three branches of government in public esteem. 4 The situation
could not be worsened if the red velour curtain were to be swept
aside, so that all could know the operations of the Court. We believe
that in fact public esteem would rise if there were to be widespread
dissemination of the intricacies and difficulties, the workload and the
burdens of the nine Justices. Latter-day intellectual haruspication will
no longer suffice.85
84. A national opinion sampling conducted by Gallup Organization in 1972 had
the following result:
Question: How much trust and confidence do you have in (a) the Executive branch





STATE OF TX{E NATION 241 (W. Watts & F. Free eds. 1973).
85. Chief Justice Burger said in a footnote in the Pentagon Papers case, that he
has little doubt about the inherent power of the Court to protect the confidentiality
of its internal operations-by whatever judicial measures may be required. 403 U.S.
713, 752 n.2 (1971) (dissenting opinion). We are not here arguing about the power
of the Court to keep its operations secret; rather, we question the desirability of such a
practice. However, we doubt the claim of inherent power; it has no warrant in logic,
history or democratic theory.
We may also mention that we disapprove of the burning of late Justice Hugo L.
Black's "bench notes," contained in more than 600 green covered looseleaf binders,
after his death, as directed by him. Justice Black is reported to have taken the view
that the notes he made during discussions with the other Justices and the votes as he
recorded them were private and must be destroyed after his death. Schweid, Hugo Black's
Alexandria Home for Sale, Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1971, § A, at 24, col. 1. This view
is untenable as the records pertained to his performance of public duties as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and should have been not only
preserved but also made available to members of the public who might have been in-
terested in them.

